Book Reviews

Patrick Finney (ed.), The Origins of the Second World War. London: Arnold, 1997. Pp.xvi + 461, index. £15.99. ISBN 0–340–67640‐X.

Maria Emilia Paz, Strategy, Security, and Spies: Mexico and the US as Allies in World War II. University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997. Pp.xii + 264, 10 illus., biblio., index. $55 (cloth); $19.95 (paper). ISBN 0–271–01665–5 and 01666–3.

Norman J.W. Goda, Tomorrow the World: Hitler, Northwest Africa and the Path toward America. College Station, Texas A&;M University Press, 1998. Pp.xxvi + 307, 2 maps, biblio., index. $39.95. ISBN 0–89096–807–1.

Michael J. Hogan, A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945–1954. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Pp.xii + 525, biblio., index. £25; $34.95. ISBN 0–521–64044‐X.

Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999. Pp.viii + 270, index. $35. ISBN 0–801403201–4.

Eric Arnett (ed.), Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control in South Asia after the Test Ban, SIPRI Research Report No.14. Oxford: Oxford University Press/Stockholm Int Peace Research Institute, 1998. Pp.viii + 98, index. £12.99. ISBN 0–19–8294115.

T.V. Paul, Richard J. Harknett and James J. Wirtz (eds.), The Absolute Weapon Revisited: Nuclear Arms and Emerging International Order. Ann Arbor, Michigan: The University of Michigan Press, 1998. Pp.vi + 312, index. $47.50/£36. ISBN 0–472–10863–8.     

Britain and the chevaline project: The hidden nuclear programme, 1967–82

With the words quoted above, the new Secretary of State for Defence in the Thatcher government revealed for the first time the existence of a project that have remained a closely guarded secret, even from amny Cabinet members of four governments, since the late 1960s. Despite the passage of more thatn 20 years since Mr Pym's announcement, the story of the Chevaline project still remains largely unknown outside a small group of select politicians, officials and scientists. This article sets out to use recently declassified documents and what is in the public domain to tell the story of Chevaline from the secret debates about the need to improve Britain's Polaris deterrent force shortly after it was deployed in the late 1960s to the official announcement of the project in 1980 and its eventual operational deployment in 1982. In particular, attention is focused on three main questions: Why was the project kept secret for so long? Why did the improvement programme take so long to come to fruition? Why, given the spiralling costs involved, was it not cancelled? In order to consider these questions relating to what Pym described as ‘the front end’ of the Poaris missile, it is necessary to begin by looking at the background to the project.     

Churchill's naval holiday: Arms control and the Anglo‐German naval race, 1912–1914

Brian Johnson, The Secret War. London: BBC, 1978. Pp. 352; £6.50.

R. V. Jones, Most Secret War: British Scientific Intelligence 1939–45. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1978. Pp. xx + 556; £7.95.

Solly Zuckerman, From Apes to Warlords 1904–46. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1978. Pp. 00 (Information not available from publisher); £8.50.

Adrian Preston, ed., General Staffs and Diplomacy before the Second War. London: Croom Helm, 1978. Pp. 138; £5.95.

W. G. F. Jackson. ’Overlord’: Normandy 1944. London: Davis Poynter, 1978. Pp. 250; £6.75.

Richard K. Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises. Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University Press, 1977. Pp. 292 + index + appendices; Np.

Gerard J. Mangone, Marine policy for America—The United States at Sea. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1977. Pp. 370, £17.50.

F. M. Richardson, Fighting Spirit. London: Leo Cooper, 1978. Pp. 189 + xv; £7.50.

Allen R. Millet, Ed., A Short History of the Vietnam War. London &; Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978. Pp. 169; £2.75.

Robert P. Berman, Soviet Airpower in Transition. Washington: Brookings, 1978. Pp. 82; $2.95 (Paper).     

Countering the effects of IED systems in Afghanistan: an integral approach

The current approach to countering the threat of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in Afghanistan has met with limited success. The relative lack of success may be in part because the current approach is not holistic and discounts the social systems that foster the IEDs. Insurgents are using IEDs as a tool to further their strategic aims, but the coalition and to a lesser extent the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) are attacking the IEDs as if they are an end in and of themselves. Combining network disruption with information change maximizes the opportunities for mitigating the IED threat. More specifically, to mitigate the IED threat requires disrupting the social and economic systems associated with IEDs, and at the same time providing alternative economic opportunities and improving rule of law and governance at the local level. In other words, counter-IED (C-IED) must be Counter-Insurgency (COIN) centric to be successful. This paper reviews the current state of C-IED efforts, identifies five main problems with the current approach, and suggests changes to reduce or mitigate the IED threat in Afghanistan.